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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

Case No.

-vs.-

9546

DAVID FARNSWORTH,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

~~ .\ TE~fENT

0 F THE CA.AE

This appeal is brought by appellant from an order
denyjng theo appellant's motion for a ne'v trial, as entered by the Honorable C~harles <+. (~o"'"ley, District
Judge, in the Second Judicial District, In and For W eher
(jonnt~'"· No Pvidence '"as offered at the hearing.
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·The app·ellant is hereinafter referred to as Defendant and the Respondent, State, as they appeared below.
The Defendant was charged with the crime of Second
Degree Burglary. At trial, where the jury had been
,,. .aived, the Defendant was found guilty and was consequently sentenced, in the absence of his attorney, to serve
not more than twenty years. Defendant had, prior to the
imposition of sentence, retained the services of the counsPl who now represents him on appeal. During trial, Defe·ndant 'vas represented by another attorney.
Prior to the filing of this appeal, present counsel for
the Defendant moved for a ne"\v trial on the ground that
defendant " . R~ denied due

proces~

of the la'v in that:

1. ( 1ounsel rPpresenting the Defendant at the trial
"\Yas ineon1petent and Defendant therefore "\vas denied
effPetiYf)
~-

repre~entation.

The rri1nP of Second Degree Burglary "\\'"as never

e~tahlished

in that the State failed to prove that the

bur~dar\" \\·n~
•

eonnnitt(\tl at nig·ht.

3. Drfendnnt

L_.;

"\Yas

denied the right to have counsel

]lresent at the ti1ne thP judg1nent
~'en ten(l·f\ i 111 pn~0d.

\\'"H~

rendered and the
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3
The District Judge denied the motion and defendant
proRf'eut~s this appeal.
The appe11ant raises the following points.
POJ"\TT I.
THE DIS'TRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'TION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE
GROUND OF INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT AND IMPOSING SENTENCE UPON 'THE CHARGE
OF SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY NOTWITHSTANDING
TI-lE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS
COMMITT'ED AT NIGH T.
1

POINT III.
THE DISTRICT ·COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STITUTION O·F THE UNITED STA'TES IN IMPOSING
SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT IN THE ABSEN,CE OF
HIS A'TTORNEY.
ARGl,.~iE~T

POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN DENYING DE,FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE
GROUND OF INCOMPETENCY OF COUNSEL.

The appellant bases this appeal upon the follo"ring
("Onstitutional provi~ion~:
AMENDMENT,,.~
l~XIT·ED

C0XSTITlTTIOX OF THE
1

STATES:

''X o person shall be held to answer for a
capital or oth.erwise infamous crime ... nor deprived of life, liberty, or property, 'Yithout due
process of ln,v. . . . ~,
A~fEXD1\fl~:KT, \TT~ COX~TITl1 TION

OF THE

1~K fTI~D ST A rr11~S:

... ln all cri1ninal prosecutions, the accused
~hall have the right ... to have th~ a8i~istance of
eoun~el for hi~ defen~P.~'
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'
AMENDMENT XT,r, SEC. 1, CONSTITUTION
1TNTTED STATES:
''(N)or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. . . ..,

.\RTICLE I, SE,C. 12, r:T AH CONSTITUTION
Hln criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by coun~r~l. . . ''

.. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property \vithout due proc.eHs of la\v."
Briefly revie,ving the trial and other pertinent proceedings, \Ve find that the case is fraught with irregularitiPs " . hirh "rarrant the closest srrutiny, for although these
discrepancies may not he, in and of themselves, such as
"'"ould justify appellate redress~ the sum total of these
irregularities appear to have contributed heavily to the
verdict and judgment, in "'"hich ease the Defendant should
c0rtnin ly he grantP(l a. nP'V triaL
.:\ t the ouh.;et "Te find that rounHel " . aived a prelimi-

narv hearing (R. 3). This, of course, could he attributed
•

to

L_

~trate~y.

YPt. in esseneP. nnlP~s good reasons are
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manifest for waiving the preliminary hearing, it would
seem that defense counsel waived Defendant's right to
one of the most instrumental and perhaps the only discovery device in a criminal proceeding. Also, by this
\vaiver, counsel for the Defendant waived the Defendant's
right to demand that the State prove "probable cause"
that a crime had been committed and that Defendant committed the rrime. It 'vould not seem material that by
retrospect, we find that the Defendant \Yas found guilty
of the crime; he nevertheless was entitled to demand that
the State prove "probable cause" before it could bind him
over for trial: A preliminary hearing is a precious
and substantial right, to be jealously guarded, and to
be 'vaived only upon request by the Defendant himself,
or \\ here it 'vould not serve the purposes previously
~tated, or "There the Defendant intends to enter a plea
of guilty. Thi~ does not appPar to be ~uch a. case.
7

ln next focusing our attention to the trial, an analyHlS of the trial records reveal~ the follo\\ing c.ourse of
conduct:
1. The jury

'va~

2. X o opening

".,.aived by defense counsel (R. 10).

~tate1nent

".,.as presented for the de-

fpn~P.

:t CounRel failed to object to evidenr.e "Thich appar(\ntl~"

"·as illegally obtained (R. 24--lG).
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-•
4. Only one of
examined (R. 24-7).

SIX

state's 'vitnesses was cross-

5. Counsel failed to attempt to impeach State's
princ.ipal "\\'"itness 'vho was an established felon (R. 2414 ).
6. The trial eourt found it necessary to establish the
county in which the crime was committed because of defense counsel's failure to compel the State to do so (R.
24-26).

7. X o witnesses or evidence 'vere presented in Defendant'~ behalf.
8. N" o closing argun1ent W'"as made hy defense counsel
(R. 24-23).

9. Defense counsel failed to comp!el the State to establish whether the crime 'vas committed at night or
during daylight hours and to prove that the crime was
proper}~,. burglary· in the second degree,, not in the third
degree (R. 2-l:-9). (Thi~ last iten1 \Yill be discussed more
fully in the arg1.11nent of Point II.)
Again, these irregularities 1nay not, independently,
be Hufficient to justify a trial de novo, yet "\\'"hen all of
these disc.repancie~ appear in a single ease, the only logical conch~~ion i~ that Defendant did not receive effective
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and competent representation. In effect, Defendant had
no representation. If "~e arrive at any other conclusion
\\'"e 'vould, in e~~ence, be adopting the rule that the terrn
"'representation hy eounS'el" merely n1eans physical or
perfunctory representation.
To ~ubstantiate the argument that Defendant "\\.,.as not
con1pletely and effectively represented by counsel at trial~
".,.e need only to allude to the transcript of the trial. The
total efforts of defense counsel during thi~ entire proePPding ":rere:

1. The cross-examining of one "itness.
2. Objectin?: to four questions.
This~

hy any ~tandard~ does not seen1 to qualify defense
(·oun~rr~ condtH·t n~ effectiYt)_. ~nb~tnntial or cou1petent
~'OUll~(•]illQ.'.

To quote Judge \\. . alter E. Hoff1nan, District Judge
of the I.,.n1terl ~tates Di~tr1ct ( 1 0nrt for the Eastern District nf

\~irginia.

• ~rrhe entire trial in the court belo'v had the

Pa r1nn rk~ of an e.r }JO rte proreeding. If Defendant
had been ""'ithout the servirP~ of an attorney, but
had re1nained ntute, it is unlikely that he 'vould
have been ""'or~e off." ,Johns r. 8nu1fh~ 176 F.
~upp. 9-!9, 953, ( 1959).
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In Johns v. Smyth, counsel for Defendant waived
opening staternent, failed to request instructions on the
Defendant's behalf, failed to introduce evidence for Defendant's case, and failed to present a closing argwnent.
These discrepancies are practically identical to those in
the case before the Court. If any distinctions are to be
rnade between Johns v. Srnyth and this case, the distinction would be that in the case before this Court, Defendant presents a stronger and more convincing argument.
Granted that perhaps the motivating factors whieh may
have led to counsel's rnisconduct in both cases may differ.
ln the Johns' Case, counsel's misconduct was attributed
to his "conscious belief that the Defendant was guilty of
the e.rime charged." In the present case, the reason for
rotmsel's rnisconduct is not known. Nevertheless, the
1notive behind counsel's ineffectiveness is not the gov~rn
ing factor in determining "Thether Defendant was effectively, eomp·et'ently, and substantially represented by
r.otmsel. . Our p·rimary concern is "rhether, irresp~eetive
of motives, counsel in fact undertook the defensP to the
best of his ability.

In State ex rei Parker v. Jameson, 75 R.D. 196, 61
X.W. 2d 832, 833, (1953) the Court stated:
"A la":yer, 'vhether paid or not, whether un~ympathetic and disbelieving his client's case or
not, whether the offense alleged i~ abhorrent or
in high disfavor "Tith current public vie"r or not,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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is bound by the ethics of his profession and our
judicial system to present the cause of the dese,rving and the despicable defPndant '''ith equal
zea.]
~'

Can ,-re still logically maintain that, not,vithstanding
all of the irregularities which the trial record reveals,
Defendant 'vas effectively, competently, and substantially
repres ented hy counsel~ On thr contrary, the representatoin ""'"a.s of such lo""'" order that it was tantamount to no
representation. This rase could readily qualify under
the test of People r. DurpPe. 319 P.2rl :19~ +fl~ 1;)() C A.. 2(1.
(iO. \\"']1Pre the ronrt statrrl:
1

1

•.

'·The representation must be of such a lo·w·
order as to render the trial a farce and a mockery
of justice ... or it must be sho"\\..n that the essential integrity of the proceeding as a trial " ..a~ de~troyPd by thP inrolnpPtency· of eonn~Pl. ..
This rase substantiate~ the rnlr first statPrl in ni.a.fls
Vir Pl r·h. RO 1~. ~ ...\ pp. D. c·. ;>. 1-+ "'· :.?d ()( }7. (}70.

r.

r11 the presrnt rase. had ])efendant "Taived the right
to eounsel at the outRet no greater injury could haYP
hPfallen hi1n than that "'hirh l1e ~nffered \Yith roun~el
preHent. 'ThP intnle-d iate pro blen1, then, is to deter1nine
\\'hat tPRtR have heen fashioned by the rourts "~hirh haYe
heen ronfronted \Yith rases si1nilar to this raRe and to
fu rthrr drtPrlnine ""''hethPr t hi~ r:=t ~P ronlrl qn:=t 1ify· nnrler
t llP~P

tP~·d·~.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

In P(nrell r . ._<.,Ytate of L1lnbanla, 287 {;.s. -!5, 71, 53 S.
Ct. 57, 77 L. Ed. 158, the United States Supreme Court
formulated the test of "substantial representation." That
i~, unless counsel provides ~ubstantial r<?presentation,
the Defendant is denied his right to effective counsel.
Another theory is that Defendant may not complain as to
the competency of his attorney ' Unless the eon duct of
defense counsel "ras ~o had that the trial judge or proseen tor "\\'"as required to act in order to pTeseTve the rights
of the aecused." llnited Staffs r. Warren, D. l 1• N.Y. 181
~-,. Supp. 138, ( 1959). Still another test requires that
defense counsel "vigorously present every legal defen~e
and represent hiln with his ut1nost skill and ability., .
.A IJ ralunn r. State, 228 Ind. 179, 91 NE 2d 358, 360, ( 1950) .
..-\_ fourth t<?st requires that the integrity of the trial be
destroyed hy counsel's incompetence or that the trial be
rendered a farce and a mockery of justice: People r.
/) 11 rJJPP, nri'{Jl/8 1'. "fill Pl rlz. supra.
4

J n appl~·ing our casr to the various test fashione-d
h~T the rourts, there see1ns to be little doubt, if any, that
t hr trial helo\r \\·a~ rendered a farce and n1ockery of justier. c•ounsel did not present every rlefense and rep·re:-:Pnt defpnflnnt "Tith 111~ uhnost skill.
~lore ~peeifirall~T·

the

~tate

\\"" eber

.inter alia, rounsel failed to compel

to prove that the cri1ne \Yas co1nmitted within

C~ounty

and

thi~

discrepancy \\·as rorrected only

Ht the ronPln~ion of the trial anrl hy the judge. Counsel
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failed to compel the State to prove that the crime ""'"as
committed at night, a discrepancy which could spell a
difference between a 1naximum of twenty years imprisonment and a maximum of three years. This discrepancy
"\\'as never corrected. Counsel failed to take the necessary steps to disclose that the State's principal witness
'vas an established felon. Counsel failed to object to testinlony by the police officers even when by their own
testimony, these officers indicated that there was a strong
probability that the evidence was illegally obtained in
that the officers did not have a warrant for the arrest
of the Defendant, and thus violated the rule against illegal search and seizure. These are the more flagrant
trespasses upon Defendant's rights under the Due Process clause of our Constitution but \ve need not stop here.
Other discrep·anrie~ arP enlunerated on page three of this
brief.
In considering the facts of this case, there appear~
to be but one conclusion: Defendant \\""as not afforded
the effective and competent representation ·w,.hich is guaranh•·e<l to hiu1 h~. . our Constitution; Defendant did not
rpe:eivP the fair trial conten1plated hy the Due Proc.ess
clause of the Fifth A1nendn1ent. To arrive at any other
conclusion 'vould be to condone unscrupulous conduct by
eonn~~rl. lly c-ondoning such 1nisconduct \Ye destroy the
integrity of the profession. By placing our sta1np of
approval on 1nisconduct such as " . . e find in the case before
thP ( 1onrt, \Yr "Tould hP, in effect, nullifying any Constitutional right~ "'r n1ny have had to a fair trial.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1:1

Finally, it is convenient to note that our Constitution
does not distingui~h het,Yeen Defendants 'vho retain
rounsel~ and Defendants "\Yho have counsels appointed
to then1. Thus, in determining "\Yhether defendant, in this
<·a~P, \\·a~ properly represented hy counsel, "'"e ~hould not
di~ting'ui~h
~Pl.

In
stated:

bet,veen retained counsel and appointed coun-

di~cu~~ing

this point. the Indiana

~upreme

( 1onrt

"This right (right to effective representation)
i~ not defeated n1erely beeau~e an accused himself
e1nploys incon1petent counsel ,,. .ho af'ford inadequate representation.'' Abrahnn1 r. Statr. supra.
The defendant
and

competent!~. .

submit~

that he 'vas not adequately

represented at trial and therefore a trial

de norn should be granted.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDG~IENT

AND IMPOSING SENTENCE UPON THE CHARGE

OF SECOND DEGREE BGRGLARY NOTWITHSTANDING
THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE CRIME WAS
COMl\liTTED AT NTGHT.

ln this matter, the State, at best, 'Yas able to provP

that the c.rime " . . a~ committed •·shortly after midnight in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the early hourse of the morning." (R. 24-9). Our legislators have expressly provided:
""When in a prosecution for burglary in the
second degree the question as to whether the crime
ha~ been committed in the nighttime or in the
daytime cannot be definitely arrived at by the
jury, (or trier of the facts) a verdict of guilty of
burglary in the third degree, as defined in section
76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, may be found,
provided, the other elements of the crime of burglary in the third degree, as defined in said section
76-9-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, have been
pro\ed.'' Title 76" Chapter 9" Section 3.
fn analyzing this provision, son1e dispute 1nay arise
as to "-rhetheT the \Vording of the statute requires that
thP charge of se~.ond de·gree burglary be automatically
deereased to third degree burglary or "Thether the Trial
1
( ourt has the discretion to uphold the conviction on the
former offense notwithstanding the absence of any evid<-~nre w·hicl1 \vould establish the time the crime \vas comlui t tPd.
Jnasmuch as one of the essential ele1nents of second

<legrPP hurglary i~ that it he con1mitted at night, and in~u~Inuch a~ every ele1nent of the crilne 1nust be proved
hPfor<> the State\~ rase is eomplete, the only logical conclu:.;ion ~PPlllH to he that it is incuinbent upon the Di8trict
.1tldgP to d<'flrea~P th0 ~harge. n~ a 1natter of la\Y·. fron1
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second degree to third degree if the state fails to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the burglary was committed
at night.
In the case at bar, the State proved merely that the
offense was committed ''shortly after midnight in the
early hours of the morning." Aside from this testimony,
the record is devoid of any testimony or evidence which
would tend to establish that the burglary occurred before
~unru;;e.

As early as 1907, the Supreme Court of Utah, confronted with a similar fact situation, decided that the
time of the offense must be conclusively established or
the charge of second degree hurglary c.annot be sustained.
ThP ronrt .'-dnferl:
HFrom the evidence it appears the goods were
f'tolen sometime between 9 :30 in the evening and
6 :30 in the morning. But G:30 a.m. is nearly two
hours after sunrise; hence, if it be admitted that
the Defendant was proven to have taken the goods,
~till it is i111possible to say from the pToof that
he took them in the nighttime, for he may have
taken them after sunrise and he fore 6 :30 a.m. Nor
are there any circumstances in evidenee of such
a character as to shovv bevond a reasonable doubt
that the prisoner took the goods in the nighttime."
State ,r.JJ!Nler, (i7 P. 790, 2~ 1.... 312.
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Obviously, this case confirms the argument that the
State must beyond reasonable doubt prove that the crime
ooourred before sunrise. It "J'ould logically s-eem to follo'v
that testimony to the effect that the crime was committed "shortly after midnight in the early hours of the
morning" does not support the charge of second degree
burglary beyond reasonable doubt. At best, we may
harbor suspicions that the burglary occurred in the nighttirne. In State v. Miller, supra, Justiee Bartch, speaking
for the SuprPn1e Court of r:tah, stated:

•'\\r P may f-'Uspieion quite f'trongly that it "Tas,
( cornmitted at night) but suspicions, ho"\vever
strong, are not sufficient to convict men of crimes.
There n1ust he evidence of every element of the
erin1e and it rnust be of sufficient ,,. .eight to conYlnee an iJnpartial jury beyond a rea.sonab]f\
tlouht.··
']~his

is the only lT tah ease in point, but courts of our
sister states have arrived at the same conclusion as the
~uprPnH) (~onrt of Utah did in . ~filler.
.
SU})ra.

ln Sta.te

~F'N.zpatri,ck,

239 P. 2d 529, 1251\font. 4:-!S,
thP Snprerne Court o'f l\lontana indicated that 'vhere the
jnfor1nation sperifirall~.,. charges a nighttime burglary,
tlH~ TlefPndant cannot he convicted 1mless the State
proved beyond a reasonahle doubt. that f'uch burglary
\\~a~ <~onnni tterl beforP ( 3 :56 a.1n.) the time of sunrise
on~ t'ltP 1norning- the rriHH' ""''ft~ discovered. Moreover~ the
'L'.
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eourt indicated that it is not sufficient to convict the
Defendant where the evidence merely "discloses that the
hurglary was committed betw,.een 3 :15 a.m. when the club
building closed and 8:00 a.m. 'vhen it next opened."
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Dougherty, indicated that, "'here a person is charged 'vith a
nighttime erime, it is not enough to show that the crime
occurred bet\veen 7 :30 p.m. and 9 :30 p.m. when the record
disclosed that the sun set at 7:52 p~.m. 352 P. 2d 1031,
1R6 Kan. 820, ( 1960). The court further stated:
''Where there is nothing to show that the
entry 1nay not have been made and that property
taken during the daytime, the, jury is not warranted in finding the entry 'Yas made in the nighttime.
In State v. Rice, 93 l{an. 589, 14-l- P. 1016, we held
that where defendant was convicted of burglary in
the nighttime without evidence showing at what
time the offense ":as committed, burglary in the
daytime being the lesser of the two offenses, the
presumption in favor of the defendant is that the
crime U'as committed in the ~daytime." State 'l'.
Douqherty, ~upra, pp. 1031-32.
As Chief Justice Brontly of the Supreme Court of
~rontan a. BfafPrl:
'~When

the pleader, as in this case, 1nakes the
specific eha rge of a burglary in the night6me ...
he must he held to the proof of the eharges as
made. . . . '' State v. J?ifzpatrick. ~upra.
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In the case at bar, the State has eharged a nighttime
crime, namely; burglary in the second degree. It was
thus incumbent upon the prosecution, as pleader, to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed
he-fore sunrise. The State failed to earry this burden of
proof to a sufficient and convincing degree and the court
:-;hould thPrefore remand this case to the District Court
\vith an order to eorrect this error.
POINT III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED DEFENDANT THE
FAIR TRIAL PROVIDED FOR BY T·HE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION

O~F

THE UNITED STATES IN IMPOSING

SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT IN THE ABSENCE OF
HIS A'TTORNEY.

As is (•vidence b~,. the reeord on appeal (R. 24-4A)
upon request of defense counseL the date and tin1e for
~entencing \\,.as ~Pt for July 10, 1961, at 2 :00 p.m. Ho",._
Pver. aR the record indicates, (R. 2-!-4A) the court helo""
.i1nposed
in

~0ntence

<lflfPn~('

nt 10:00 a.1n. on thP day in question

ronnsel's absenrP.

lipon this

i~~lH\

the Inajority of the courts seen1

to hold "·ith the rule that defendant is entitled to have
eoun~el

prc·~('nt

r1t the ti1ne judgment i~ entered and
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sentence is imposed unless Defendant clearly and intelligently \Yaives his right to counsel. The rule is best
stated in People v. Fields, Cal. App., 198 P. 2d 104, (1948)
in which the California Court held:
Hinasmuch as the arrignment for judgment
and pronouncing of judgment are clearly a phase
of eriminal prosecution, the defendant herein was
denied that constitutional right."

In a more recent case, the Supreme Court of California affirmed this rule and hrld:
"The denial of counsel at sentence is a denial
of a constitutional right." Ex Parte Tu1~rieta; 2
Cal. Reporter, 884, 886, (1960).
"Gpon this precise point, to-wit: the entering of judgn1ent and imposition of sentence in counsel's absence,
the case at bar appears to be one of first imp~ression in
this court. Ho"Tever, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Cirruit has clearly indieated its vie\\rs upon this problem.
In Batson v. [rnited Statrs, 137 F. 2d 288, (1943), the
eourt .r...·fafrrl:
'Ve believe that an accused should have the
opportunity to be heard by counsel on the sentence
to be imposed, and thata court should not imp,ose
sentence in the absence of counsel \vithout expressly ascertaining that a defendant does not
desire his presenre. 1Ia.ny c.on~iderations in4

'
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fluenee the length of a sentence which is to be
imposed, and a defendant should have the opportunity to have his attorney present any mitigating
circumstances to the court for its consideration
in d(_)termining- the """eight of the sentence.''
In WNl.is t'. Hunter, this same court again emphasized the importanrP of counsel's presence at sentencing.
The court s·tated:
''Since the right to counsel is a matter of
substance, not of form, it is the solemn duty of
the trial judge to make sure that representation
is not an empty gesture but a fulfillment of the
spirit and purpose of the constitutional mandate."
~'\\T e

think that the right to effectiYe assistarrce of rounsel contemplates the guiding hand of
an able and responsiv·e la-\Yyer, devoted solely to
the intere~t of hi~ client: "\Yho h.as runple opportunity to acquaint himself "ith the law and the
facts of the case, and is afforded an opportunity
to present then1 to thP court or jury in their
u1ost favorable light. If an accused does not have
thP assistanre of eolmsel """hen entering a plea
or "'"hen sentence is in1posed, it must be clear to
the court that he has con1petently and intelligently "\\Taived such rig-ht.'' 166 F. 2d 7~1, 723, ( CA
·10th Ci r. 1 n++).
In thP r.n~P at bar, defendant did not 'Yaive his right

to

<·oun~el

at

an~~

sta_ge of th0 prore·edin.g. On tl1e con-
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trary, defense counsel expressly indicated that he would
he at the sentencing. The court below nevertheless entered judgment and imposed sentence in counsel's absence. Clearly defendant was denied his right to have
counsel present at every stage of the proceeding and
'vas consequently denied a substantial right under our
Constitution.
upon these grounds, the eause should be remanded
to the District Court to remedy this error.

The defendant, in the case before the Court, was
clearly denied the fair trial "rhich the Due Process Clause
of our Conf;titution insures us .
.Jioreover, the trial judge, in failing to decrease the
charge against defendant from burglary in the Recond
degree to burglary in the third degree, failed to give the
dPfendant the benefit of the prestm1ption, as provided hy
our

~tatnte~~

Finally,

that the

le~~Pr

defendant"~

<'Tilne "'"as eo1nmitted.

constitutional rights were fur-

ther infringed upon hy the fact tha;t the trial court entered judgrnent and impo~ed ~(}ntence upon the defendant
in defense

counsel'~

absence.
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J~ ~~

upholding the aeeision of the lo,ver eourt and by

placing our

~ta.1np

1ni~earriage

clone thP
ll~l ~~ npo11

onr eiyjl

T'hp defendant
P(l

to the

of a pproYa 1 upon

it.

,,.P in fact con-

of justi(le nnd encourau-.-. the

trP~.:

lihertjr~"-

subn1it~. thi~

Di~trirt ·Con rt

cause should be remand-

'Yith an order for a trinl r1 P noro.

:JIIT~.1~X . \n~\

&

RO~~

and

-:\f. IIIS.A. T .A T~F:
411 to r n ey s tor ..:1 p pe ll nn t

!-~ r ~XXJ~:TH
1

1 O:l

l~n1pi.re

·2:~1 J·~.

Building

Fourth Snnth
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